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 Some issues covered in a presentation at the 4th annual conference on UNEP’s Insurance Initiative, Oslo,
Norway 10 June 1999.
&,&(523ROLF\1RWH
Flexible instruments in climate policy
4
$EVWUDFW
The presentation covers three main themes:
1. Flexible mechanisms and cost effectiveness.
2. Taxes vs. emission quotas: Some lessons from Norway.
3. Some issues related to the construction of a national emission trading regime.
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 )OH[LEOHPHFKDQLVPVDQGFRVWHIIHFWLYHQHVV
Why does economist perceive the so-called flexible instruments as advantageous in climate
policy, in particular? The short answer is FRVWHIIHFWLYHQHVV. For a given target, for instance a
ceiling on national greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, flexible – or market based – instruments
like GHG taxes or systems with tradable emission quotas, have the potential to secure equal
marginal costs across emission sources. This implies that the costs of reducing an additional
unit of emissions are the same for all participants in the system, and hence nobody will be
interested in exchanging their marginal emission reductions with anybody else. In this
situation the total cost of reductions is minimal.
Cost effectiveness is obviously an attractive property of the flexible mechanisms, and quite
often put forward as a more or less self-evident criterion for any proposed control policy.
However, it should be recognised that the cost minimising feature is only valid in relation to
the given target (e.g. national emissions). If another target is more appropriate (e.g. the global
emission level), the national cost minimising instruments may no longer secure a rational
(economist’s speak for cost minimising) policy. So, in discussing appropriate flexible
instruments it is important to be specific with regard to the target one has in mind.
In addition, one should recognise that in the political world, cost effectiveness is not the only,
and often not even the most important, dimension to measure alternative policy options
against. Common concerns in climate policy debates, in addition to limiting the amount of
GHG emissions, are regional impacts of the policy, for instance in terms of employment
issues and other more general distributional consequences. Thus, the economist’s mantra of
cost effectiveness is often relegated to a low priority item in practical politics.
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 7D[HVYVHPLVVLRQTXRWDV$Q\OHVVRQVWROHDUQ
IURP1RUZD\"
GHG taxes and tradable emission quotas are the two instruments most often discussed in
relation to the use of flexible instruments. In theory, they are very similar instruments with
many common features. In practice the difference may be larger.
Today we see in Europe a high interest in the implementation of so called green taxes in
general and GHG taxes in particular. Italy has recently introduced a CO2 tax and several other
countries (UK, Germany, The Netherlands) are on the brink of doing likewise
In this relation it is interesting to note that Norway (together with a few other small countries)
already in the early 1990s introduced a so-called CO2 tax. I say ‘so-called’, because the tax
was not really tied to CO2 emissions at all, but was instead based on a series of tax rates for
various fossil fuels, see figure. In addition the power intensive and export oriented industry
(responsible for some 40% of Norwegian CO2 emissions) was all together exempted from the
tax. Attempts over the years to harmonize the tax rates in term of CO2 emissions and to
include all sectors in the tax regime has met with strong lobbying from the exempted sectors
in particular and generally met with defeat.
)LJXUH&2WD[HVLQ1RUZD\DGMXVWHGIRULQIODWLRQ
An additional important feature of the tax regime has been the frequent renegotiations of the
tax rates that has taken place, generally twice yearly in connection with the general debates on
the national budgets. The tax has therefore not been treated as primarily an environmental tax,
but rather been an integral part of the fiscal tax regime. The general uncertainty this has
generated for the manufacturing industry in particular, has been the main argument used by
these sectors against the tax regime as such.
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A proposal by the current government to take a (small) step in the direction of more
harmonized CO2 tax rates last year was defeated in Parliament who instead decided that a
system with tradable national emission quotas should be explored. A committee was set up to
do so, and is expected to report by the end of this year. Several guidelines were put down by
the Parliament, among them that the system should at least cover the sectors now exempted
from the CO2 tax. The total ‘width’ of the system was, however, left open. In addition it was
decided that the exempted sectors should receive emission quotas covering 70% of their
1990-emissions. At the same time the Parliament expressed concern for the current revenue
level of the CO2 tax (approximately NOK 8 billion).
The decision by the Parliament to go for a national quota system instead of, or in addition to,
the tax regime, was generally received favorably by the manufacturing industry. Presumably
this was because the tradable emission quota system is perceived as a more stable system that
the current tax regime, giving more certainty to the operating environment for the industry.
Thus, overall we have seen in Norway a move away from taxes and towards a tradable
emission quota system. It suggests that those countries now most eager to implement GHG
taxes should take a close look at the Norwegian experience and decide on that basis whether
they should, as an alternative to the proposed taxes, go directly for a quota system.
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 $QDWLRQDOHPLVVLRQWUDGLQJUHJLPH6RPH
LVVXHV
A national emission quota trading system raises a number of design issues. I will not have the
opportunity here to cover them all, but rather make some comments on some of the more
important concerns.
 :KRVKRXOGEHFRYHUHGE\DQDWLRQDOTXRWDV\VWHP"
First of all, we have in Norway the question of the ‘width’ of the quota system. In other
words, who should be included in the national trading system, and who should be kept out,
and then presumably still be regulated under a tax regime. Several relevant observations can
be put forward in this regard:
- The tradable emission quota system, or emission trading system for short, will be more
cost efficient the broader it is, given a ceiling on national GHG emissions. Broad
participation will secure that sources with high abatement costs can be better matched
with sources that can reduce their emissions at a relatively low cost.
- As a corollary follows that within what can be termed a Kyoto regime, i.e. a situation
where the Kyoto protocol has entered into force and private firms have access to emission
quotas through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Joint Implementation (JI) or
International Emission Trading (IET), more reductions will be undertaken at home the
broader the national quota system is. In other words, broad participation in the national
quota system will support the so-called supplementary principle1 put down in the Kyoto
protocol.
- Finally, in the Kyoto regime it will be next to impossible to exclude some sectors of the
economy from the national quota system. The reason is that sectors ‘inside’ the national
quota system can sell quotas on the international market where sectors ‘outside’ the
national quota system can buy them and earn national credits.
 /RVVRIUHYHQXHIURPWKH&2WD[
The Parliament’s concern with revenue neutrality is understandable, given that current CO2
tax rates are substantially higher than the expected international quota price in a Kyoto
regime. Abolition of the tax in favor of a national quota system where the quota price will be
determined internationally, may thus lead to a substantial loss of revenue. There are two
comments I wish to put forward in this regard.
- First, it is wrong to associate the loss of tax revenue with the introduction of a national
quota system. Rather it is a consequence of the Kyoto protocol as such, since
                                                
1
 The supplementary principle states that the use of the international flexible mechanisms (JI, CDM and IET)
should be supplementary to national emission reductions.
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internationally acquired quotas (through CDM, JI or IET) in any case will reduce the CO2
tax base in Norway.
- Second, the revenue loss can, at least to some extent, be countered by auctioning off or
selling the national quotas to the participants. With a broadly based national quota system
a significant part of the revenue loss can then be prevented.
 (DUO\FUHGLWLQJLQWKHLQWHULPSHULRG"
Both of these points (the width of the national system and the loss of revenue) have been
commented on from the point of view of a Kyoto regime, i.e. a situation where the Kyoto
protocol has entered into force. It is, however, far from certain that the protocol will be
ratified by the number of parties required2 to ever enter into force. In any case, we face an
interim period before the Kyoto regime comes alive where the question of early crediting begs
an answer.
In Norway this is really only an issue for the sectors exempted from the CO2 tax. Sectors
currently under the tax regime have plenty of incentives already to reduce their emissions. In
any case, early crediting requires rules, laws and regulations covering such difficult topics as
how to establish a credible baseline, and how to verify and certify early efforts to reduce
emissions. In my view it would be better to spend our resources on an effort to establish at the
earliest possible time a national emission quota system, instead of establishing more or less
parallel rules for early credits. Thus, also in the interim period I will argue that a broadly
based and tradable national quota system is a good solution. It is important to be aware that
the alternative to this is not a policy free regime. Rather the alternative could be a tax regime,
or a regime based on a command and control policy.
 $OORFDWLRQRIQDWLRQDOTXRWDV
If, as stipulated by the Parliament, some of the national quotas are going to be given away for
free, we are of course in for a fight over the endowment of quotas, both initially and then over
time. From this point of view, going for a straight market based allocation mechanism (like
for instance auctions of some kind) could save much energy and frustration.
It is also important to be aware of the fact that within a fully tradable regime, i.e. a regime
without restrictions on the trade of the quotas, it does not matter to the functioning of the
mechanism how the quotas are allocated. In particular, it will not have any effect on the
amount of emission reductions undertaken by the firms, nor will it have an impact on the
amount of ‘carbon leakage’. In order to avoid carbon leakages, i.e. the phenomenon that a
regulated firm may move abroad in order to avoid the implied control costs, the quota
allocation must be associated with restrictions on the tradability of the quotas. One suggestion
is to prohibit the sale of quotas when firms shut down or move abroad in an effort to keep
work places in the country. These types of restrictions will however have a negative impact
on the cost effectiveness of the system. Overall it must therefore be better to try to preserve
                                                
2
 The requirement is that 55 parties representing at least 55% of the CO2 emissions in the Annex I-countries in
1990 should ratify the treaty before it enters into force.
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working places and handle distributional issues, etc. by use of more appropriate tools than
climate policy instruments, flexible or not.
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